论文标题
有限广泛游戏的计算机科学家的教程，提供完美的信息
A tutorial for computer scientists on finite extensive games with perfect information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为有限的广泛游戏提供了独立的介绍，并提供了完美的信息。在这些游戏中，玩家在每个阶段都有有限的动作，每场比赛总是结束，并且在每场比赛中，球员都对先前做出的动作有着完全的了解。几乎所有讨论的结果都是众所周知的，但通常不会以最佳形式呈现它们。而且，它们通常出现在针对经济学家或数学家的文献中，因此算法或逻辑方面的代表性不足。
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In these games players proceed in turns having, at each stage, finitely many moves to their disposal, each play always ends, and in each play the players have complete knowledge of the previously made moves. Almost all discussed results are well-known, but often they are not presented in an optimal form. Also, they usually appear in the literature aimed at economists or mathematicians, so the algorithmic or logical aspects are underrepresented.
