论文标题
验证攻击树具有攻击效果：Barwise-Seligman的渠道理论的方法
On Validating Attack Trees with Attack Effects: An Approach from Barwise-Seligman's Channel Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
在安全分析中，攻击树是显示攻击结构分解并支持评估攻击的定量属性（称为属性）的主要工具。但是，攻击树木本身并未确定分解的有效性，并且在攻击树不准确时可能会做出有关安全的谬误。本文通过攻击的影响丰富了攻击树木，正式的系统着重于改进方案。效果之间的关系表明攻击之间的关系，并可以系统地评估攻击分解。为了描述效果，本文应用了Barwise-Seligman的渠道理论。尤其是书信在将效果与独特的粒度联系起来。结果，分解的一致性正式定义，并说明了它的条件。该框架应用于车辆网络系统的案例研究。作为一致性思想的应用，讨论了攻击树中可能的缓解程度。
In security analysis, attack trees are a major tool for showing the structural decomposition of attacks and for supporting the evaluation of the quantitative properties (called attributes) of the attacks. However, the validities of decompositions are not established by attack trees themselves, and fallacious decisions about security may be made when the attack trees are inaccurate. This paper enriches attack trees with effects of attacks, with a formal system focusing on refinement scenarios. Relationships among effects indicate relationships among attacks and it allows for a systematic evaluation of attack decompositions. To describe effects this paper applies Barwise-Seligman's channel theory. Infomorphisms, in particular, play a significant role to connect effects with distinct granularities. As a result, the consistency of a decomposition is formally defined and a condition for it is stated. This framework is applied to a case study of a vehicular network system. As an application of the idea of consistency, possible degrees of mitigation for attacks in attack trees are discussed.
