论文标题
在准平台的平均控件中
On quasi-stationary Mean Field Games of Controls
论文作者
论文摘要
在控件的平均野外游戏中，单个代理的动态不仅受代理的分布影响，例如经典理论，而且还受其最佳策略的分布。在本文中，我们研究了准平台的控件平均野外游戏，这与代理的策略选择机制中的标准案例不同：它无法预测人口的演变，但仅根据给定时间的瞬间提供的信息选择其策略，而无需预期。我们证明了在不同的假设集中解决相应的准平均野外游戏系统解决方案的存在和唯一性，我们提供了一些模型的示例，这些模型属于这些假设。
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study quasi-stationary Mean Field Games of Controls, which differs from the standard case in the strategy-choice mechanism of the agent: it cannot predict the evolution of the population, but chooses its strategy only on the basis of the information available at the given instant of time, without anticipating. We prove existence and uniqueness for the solution of the corresponding quasi-stationary Mean Field Games system under different sets of hypotheses and we provide some examples of models which fall within these hypotheses.
