论文标题
用于多槽赞助的单独拍卖
Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search
论文作者
论文摘要
我们设计了公平的赞助搜索拍卖，在公平与质量之间取得了近乎最佳的权衡。我们的作品建立在Chawla和Jagadeesan \ Cite {CJ22}的模型和拍卖设计的基础上，后者考虑了单个插槽的特殊情况。我们考虑具有多个插槽的赞助搜索设置，并且单击的标准模型可以将可分开的速率分开为广告商特定的组件和插槽特定的组件。当类似的用户具有类似的广告商特定点击率时，我们的拍卖会在公平和质量之间实现与\ cite {cj22}相同的近乎最佳的权衡。当类似的用户可以具有不同的广告客户特定偏好时，我们表明基于偏好的公平保证就会保证。最后，我们提供了一种计算有效的算法，用于计算拍卖的计算付款以及先前工作中的付款，从\ cite {cj22}解决了另一个开放方向。
We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan \cite{CJ22}, who considered the special case of a single slot. We consider sponsored search settings with multiple slots and the standard model of click through rates that are multiplicatively separable into an advertiser-specific component and a slot-specific component. When similar users have similar advertiser-specific click through rates, our auctions achieve the same near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality as in \cite{CJ22}. When similar users can have different advertiser-specific preferences, we show that a preference-based fairness guarantee holds. Finally, we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing payments for our auctions as well as those in previous work, resolving another open direction from \cite{CJ22}.
