论文标题
您不知道我知道的：关于离散事件系统中高级不透明度的概念
You Don't Know What I Know: On Notion of High-Order Opacity in Discrete-Event Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们研究了一类信息流安全性属性，称为偏见的离散事件系统中的不透明度。粗略地说，如果由被动观察者建模的入侵者永远无法确定系统的“秘密”，则据说系统是不透明的。大多数现有的不透明度概念都考虑了与系统的实际行为相关的秘密。在本文中，我们考虑了一种与系统用户知识相关的新型秘密。具体来说，我们假设系统用户也只对系统有部分观察，并且必须推理系统的实际行为。我们说，如果入侵者永远无法根据自己的无与伦比的信息确定系统用户知道一些重要的信息，则系统是高级不透明的。我们提供了高阶不透明度的形式定义。提供了两种算法，以验证此新概念：一种具有双指数复杂性的最坏情况，另一种具有单指数复杂性。为新的高阶不透明度概念提供了说明性示例。
In this paper, we investigate a class of information-flow security properties called opacity in partial-observed discrete-event systems. Roughly speaking, a system is said to be opaque if the intruder, which is modeled by a passive observer, can never determine the "secret" of the system for sure. Most of the existing notions of opacity consider secrets related to the actual behaviors of the system. In this paper, we consider a new type of secret related to the knowledge of the system user. Specifically, we assume that the system user also only has partial observation of the system and has to reason the actual behavior of the system. We say a system is high-order opaque if the intruder can never determine that the system user knows some information of importance based on its own incomparable information. We provide the formal definition of high-order opacity. Two algorithms are provided for the verification of this new notion: one with doubly-exponential complexity for the worst case and the other with single-exponential complexity. Illustrative examples are provided for the new notion of high-order opacity.
