论文标题
最佳和强大的公共信息披露
Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information
论文作者
论文摘要
一名决策者向还获得昂贵的私人信息的互动代理商披露了公共信息。更精确的公共信息降低了获得的私人信息的精度和成本。考虑到这种效果，决策者应采用什么披露规则？我们在两个替代假设下使用线性二次高斯游戏在两个替代假设下解决了这个问题，该游戏具有任意二次材料福利和凸出信息成本。首先，决策者知道私人信息的成本，并采用最佳披露规则来最大程度地提高预期福利。其次，决策者不确定成本，并采用了强大的披露规则，以最大程度地提高最坏的案例福利。根据边际成本的弹性，最佳规则在质量上与线性信息成本或外源性私人信息相同。当且仅当在某些信息成本下完全披露最佳披露时，最糟糕的福利就严格增加了，这为中央银行透明度提供了新的理由。
A policymaker discloses public information to interacting agents who also acquire costly private information. More precise public information reduces the precision and cost of acquired private information. Considering this effect, what disclosure rule should the policymaker adopt? We address this question under two alternative assumptions using a linear quadratic Gaussian game with arbitrary quadratic material welfare and convex information costs. First, the policymaker knows the cost of private information and adopts an optimal disclosure rule to maximize the expected welfare. Second, the policymaker is uncertain about the cost and adopts a robust disclosure rule to maximize the worst-case welfare. Depending on the elasticity of marginal cost, an optimal rule is qualitatively the same as that in the case of either a linear information cost or exogenous private information. The worst-case welfare is strictly increasing if and only if full disclosure is optimal under some information costs, which provides a new rationale for central bank transparency.
