论文标题
信息专制，不同的社会
Informational Autocrats, Diverse Societies
论文作者
论文摘要
本文提出了一个专制人的理论模型，该模型控制媒体，试图说服社会的能力。我们基于贝叶斯说服框架的分析，其中公民对独裁者有异质的偏好和信念。当社会是单片和划分时，我们会表征独裁者的信息操纵策略。当社会上的偏好和信念更加多样化时，专制人士就会减少信息操纵。因此，我们的发现表明，态度和观点的多样性可以作为对敌对行为者信息操纵的堡垒。
This paper presents a theoretical model of an autocrat who controls the media in an attempt to persuade society of his competence. We base our analysis on a Bayesian persuasion framework in which citizens have heterogeneous preferences and beliefs about the autocrat. We characterize the autocrat's information manipulation strategy when society is monolithic and when it is divided. When the preferences and beliefs in society are more diverse, the autocrat engages in less information manipulation. Our findings thus suggest that the diversity of attitudes and opinions can act as a bulwark against information manipulation by hostile actors.
