论文标题
首价拍卖中的价格操纵性
Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
首价拍卖具有许多理想的属性，包括拥有一些唯一具有信誉。但是，第一价格拍卖也是固有的，非真实性，而非真实性可能导致不稳定和效率低下。鉴于这些优点和缺点，我们试图量化一定价格拍卖容易受到操纵的程度。在这项工作中，我们采用了在比特币费用设计市场中介绍的指标：通过战略性实现的付款百分比变化。我们研究了该指标对单单元和$ k $单位拍卖环境的行为，该环境具有$ n $ i.i.d的。买家，并寻求随着$ n $增长的变化百分比变化趋于零的条件。据我们所知，我们的是首次严格研究大型多单元首价拍卖容易受到操纵的程度。我们几乎完整地描述了它们在大型中真实的条件，并展现出一些令人惊讶的界限。
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non-truthfulness may result in instability and inefficiencies. Given these pros and cons, we seek to quantify the extent to which first-price auctions are susceptible to manipulation. In this work we adopt a metric that was introduced in the context of bitcoin fee design markets: the percentage change in payment that can be achieved by being strategic. We study the behavior of this metric for single-unit and $k$-unit auction environments with $n$ i.i.d. buyers, and seek conditions under which the percentage change tends to zero as $n$ grows large. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first rigorous study of the extent to which large multi-unit first price auctions are susceptible to manipulation. We provide an almost complete picture of the conditions under which they are truthful in the large, and exhibit some surprising boundaries.
