论文标题
在区块链上放入游泳池
Staking Pools on Blockchains
论文作者
论文摘要
在几个商品证明的区块链上，从事验证交易的代理商可以打开一个池，其他人可以将其股份委托以赚取更高的回报。我们在存在恶意药物的情况下开发了一个模型，并建立了平衡的存在和独特性。然后，我们确定了堆放池的潜在和风险。首先，允许放入池降低区块链安全性。但是，诚实的利益持有人获得了更高的回报。其次，通过选择福利最佳分配奖励，放入池阻止恶意代理人获得巨大的奖励。第三，当游泳池所有者可以自由地分发从验证到代表人的收益时，Staging Pools破坏了区块链操作，因为恶意代理商通过提供慷慨的回报来吸引大多数代表人。
On several proof-of-stake blockchains, agents engaged in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake in order to earn higher returns. We develop a model of staking pool formation in the presence of malicious agents and establish existence and uniqueness of equilibria. We then identify potential and risk of staking pools. First, allowing for staking pools lowers blockchain security. Yet, honest stake holders obtain higher returns. Second, by choosing welfare optimal distribution rewards, staking pools prevent that malicious agents receive large rewards. Third, when pool owners can freely distribute the returns from validation to delegators, staking pools disrupt blockchain operations, since malicious agents attract most delegators by offering generous returns.
