论文标题
强大而可扩展的游戏理论安全投资方法，用于电源系统的电压稳定性
Robust and Scalable Game-theoretic Security Investment Methods for Voltage Stability of Power Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了投资方法，以确保电力系统免受负载攻击，其中恶意入侵者（攻击者）秘密地改变了负载的反应性电源设定点，以将电网推向电压不稳定，而系统操作员（Defender）采用了反应性电力补偿（RPC）来防止不稳定性。扩展了我们先前报道的此问题的Stackelberg游戏配方，我们开发了一种强大的防御顺序算法和一种新型的遗传算法，可为大型功率系统模型提供可扩展性。使用IEEE原型电源系统模型验证了所提出的方法，该模型具有时变的负载不确定性，表明可靠且健壮的防御是可行的，除非操作员的RPC投资资源相对于攻击者的资源受到严重限制。
We develop investment approaches to secure electric power systems against load attacks where a malicious intruder (the attacker) covertly changes reactive power setpoints of loads to push the grid towards voltage instability while the system operator (the defender) employs reactive power compensation (RPC) to prevent instability. Extending our previously reported Stackelberg game formulation for this problem, we develop a robust-defense sequential algorithm and a novel genetic algorithm that provides scalability to large-scale power system models. The proposed methods are validated using IEEE prototype power system models with time-varying load uncertainties, demonstrating that reliable and robust defense is feasible unless the operator's RPC investment resources are severely limited relative to the attacker's resources.
