论文标题
IoT辅助元式同步的动态分层框架
A Dynamic Hierarchical Framework for IoT-assisted Metaverse Synchronization
论文作者
论文摘要
Metaverse最近引起了学术界和行业的广泛关注。虚拟服务从虚拟驱动器培训到在线智能产品的优化,都在元代码中出现。为了使人类的虚拟生活体验更加真实,数字双胞胎(DTS),即物理对象的数字复制品,是关键的推动者。但是,DT状态可能并不总是准确地反映其实际双胞胎的状态,因为后者可能会随着时间而变化。因此,有必要将DT与其物理对应物同步,以确保其状态对于元元中的虚拟业务是准确的。在本文中,我们提出了一个动态的层次结构框架,其中激励一组IoT设备吸引和收集物理对象的状态信息,以帮助虚拟服务提供商(VSP)同步DTS。基于收集的感应数据和DTS的价值衰减率,VSP可以确定同步强度以最大程度地提高其收益。在我们提出的动态分层框架中,下层进化游戏捕获了IoT设备人群的VSP选择,并且高级差异游戏捕获了VSPS的回报,VSPS的收益受到同步策略,IOT设备选择和DTS值的影响,而DTS值是同步的DECAMS DECICAMENANE DECICAMENANE DECICAMES MAKERS。我们进一步考虑了某些VSP是首先推动并将其扩展为Stackelberg差异游戏的情况。我们从理论上和实验上表明,对低级游戏的平衡存在并且在进化上是稳健的,并且就各种系统参数提供了灵敏度分析。实验表明,提出的动态分层游戏的表现优于基线。
Metaverse has recently attracted much attention from both academia and industry. Virtual services, ranging from virtual driver training to online route optimization for smart goods delivery, are emerging in the Metaverse. To make the human experience of virtual life more real, digital twins (DTs), namely digital replicas of physical objects, are key enablers. However, DT status may not always accurately reflect that of its real-world twin because the latter may be subject to changes with time. As such, it is necessary to synchronize a DT with its physical counterpart to ensure that its status is accurate for virtual businesses in the Metaverse. In this paper, we propose a dynamic hierarchical framework in which a group of IoT devices is incentivized to sense and collect physical objects' status information collectively so as to assists virtual service providers (VSPs) in synchronizing DTs. Based on the collected sensing data and the value decay rate of the DTs, the VSPs can determine synchronization intensities to maximize their payoffs. In our proposed dynamic hierarchical framework, the lower-level evolutionary game captures the VSPs selection by the IoT device population, and the upper-level differential game captures the VSPs payoffs, which are affected by the synchronization strategy, IoT devices selections, and the DTs value status, given VSPs are simultaneous decision makers. We further consider the case in which some VSPs are first movers and extend it as a Stackelberg differential game. We theoretically and experimentally show that the equilibrium to the lower-level game exists and is evolutionarily robust, and provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to various system parameters. Experiments show that the proposed dynamic hierarchical game outperform the baseline.