论文标题
QROM中提交和开放协议的有效nizks和签名
Efficient NIZKs and Signatures from Commit-and-Open Protocols in the QROM
论文作者
论文摘要
提交和开放的Sigma-protocols是通过Fiat-Shamir Transformation构建非交互式零知识参数和数字签名方案的流行协议类别。通过基于哈希的承诺实例化，由此产生的非交互性方案在随机的Oracle模型中享有紧密的在线提取性。在线提取性可通过避免有失去的倒带或基于叉子 - - 迷信的提取来提高由此产生的数字签名方案的安全性证明。 在这项工作中，我们在量子随机甲骨文模型（QROM）中证明了紧密的在线提取性，表明该构建支持量子后的安全性。首先，我们考虑默认情况下通过元素的哈希进行承诺。在第二部分中，我们将结果扩展到基于默克树的承诺。我们的结果对数字签名方案野餐的可证明的后量子安全性有了显着改善。 我们的分析利用了Chung等人的最新框架。 [ARXIV：2010.11658]用于使用纯经典推理分析QROM中的量子算法。因此，在没有量子信息科学的先验知识的情况下，我们的结果可以在很大程度上得到理解和验证。
Commit-and-open Sigma-protocols are a popular class of protocols for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments and digital-signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Instantiated with hash-based commitments, the resulting non-interactive schemes enjoy tight online-extractability in the random oracle model. Online extractability improves the tightness of security proofs for the resulting digital-signature schemes by avoiding lossy rewinding or forking-lemma based extraction. In this work, we prove tight online extractability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), showing that the construction supports post-quantum security. First, we consider the default case where committing is done by element-wise hashing. In a second part, we extend our result to Merkle-tree based commitments. Our results yield a significant improvement of the provable post-quantum security of the digital-signature scheme Picnic. Our analysis makes use of a recent framework by Chung et al. [arXiv:2010.11658] for analysing quantum algorithms in the QROM using purely classical reasoning. Therefore, our results can to a large extent be understood and verified without prior knowledge of quantum information science.
