论文标题
演示：对GNSS信号的中继/重播攻击
DEMO: Relay/Replay Attacks on GNSS signals
论文作者
论文摘要
全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）普遍存在定位和时间安排。在过去的几十年中，已经研究了对GNSS的攻击的检测和预防，但是根据模拟，对许多此类攻击和对策进行了研究。这项工作有助于对GNSS漏洞进行实验研究，并通过现成的硬件实施继电器/重播攻击。在信号级别运行，这种攻击类型不会受到密码保护的传输的阻碍，例如伽利略的开放信号导航消息身份验证（OS-NMA）。我们研究的攻击涉及两个勾结的对手，并在大距离内传达信号，以有效地欺骗GNSS接收器。我们使用现成的硬件证明了攻击，我们研究了这种成功的勾结攻击的要求，以及如何增强它们，例如，允许对受害者接收者进行更好的对抗性控制。
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are ubiquitously relied upon for positioning and timing. Detection and prevention of attacks against GNSS have been researched over the last decades, but many of these attacks and countermeasures were evaluated based on simulation. This work contributes to the experimental investigation of GNSS vulnerabilities, implementing a relay/replay attack with off-the-shelf hardware. Operating at the signal level, this attack type is not hindered by cryptographically protected transmissions, such as Galileo's Open Signals Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA). The attack we investigate involves two colluding adversaries, relaying signals over large distances, to effectively spoof a GNSS receiver. We demonstrate the attack using off-the-shelf hardware, we investigate the requirements for such successful colluding attacks, and how they can be enhanced, e.g., allowing for finer adversarial control over the victim receiver.
