论文标题
在竞争环境中销售信息
Selling Information in Competitive Environments
论文作者
论文摘要
数据购买者竞争了一个不完整的信息，该游戏涉及单个数据销售商拥有一些与回报有关的信息。卖方面临共同的信息和机制设计问题：决定出售哪些信息，同时引起买家的类型和征收付款。我们为具有二元行动和州的一类游戏提供了福利和收入最佳的机制。我们的结果突出了在竞争环境中销售信息的关键特性：（i）买方竞争引起的负面外部性提高了将正确措施专门推荐给一个买家的盈利能力； （ii）为了使买家遵循卖方的建议，必须有限的排他性程度； （iii）买家的服从限制还限制了垄断卖方引入的信息分配的扭曲； （iv）随着竞争变得更加激烈，这些限制变得更加严重，从而削弱了市场力量对信息分配的影响。
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers' types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from buyer competition increase the profitability of recommending the correct action to one buyer exclusively; (ii) for the buyers to follow the seller's recommendations, the degree of exclusivity must be limited; (iii) the buyers' obedience constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information introduced by a monopolist seller; (iv) as competition becomes fiercer, these limitations become more severe, weakening the impact of market power on the allocation of information.
