论文标题
关于全面披露的最佳性
On the optimality of full disclosure
论文作者
论文摘要
私人信息的发件人可以对接收者承诺任何披露政策。我们表明，在充分条件下，完全披露是最佳的，具有一些理想的特性。首先，它直接讲述了当事方的效用功能，而不是发件人的间接效用函数；这使其易于解释和可验证。其次，它不需要发件人的回报是后平均值的函数。第三，在某些特殊情况下，它比已知条件弱。因此，我们表明，在主体代理论文中常用的建模假设下，完全披露是最佳的。
A privately-informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy towards a receiver. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the utility functions of the parties, as opposed to the indirect utility function of the sender; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean. Third, it is weaker than the known conditions for some special cases. With this, we show that full disclosure is optimal under modeling assumptions commonly used in principal-agent papers.
