论文标题
通过游戏理论方法在Zerkani网络中排名
Rankings in the Zerkani network by a game theoretical approach
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍了Banzhaf和Banzhaf-Owen的价值观，作为在网络中排名恐怖分子的新型中心措施。这种新方法使网络的完整拓扑（即节点和边缘）和网络节点上的联盟结构集成在一起。更确切地说，网络的节点（例如恐怖分子）的特征及其可能的关系（例如，通信链接的类型）以及与网络无关的联盟信息（例如层次结构级别）。首先，对于这两种中心度度量，我们提供近似算法和相应的R代码。其次，作为插图，我们对Zerkani网络的成员进行排名，该网络负责巴黎（2015）和布鲁塞尔（2016）的攻击。最后，我们对Banzhaf和Banzhaf-Owen建立的排名与使用Shapley值时获得的排名（参见Hamers等，2019）与欧文值作为中心度度量
This paper introduces the Banzhaf and Banzhaf-Owen values as novel centrality measures for ranking terrorists in a network. This new approach let integrate the complete topology (i.e. nodes and edges) of the network and a coalitional structure on the nodes of the network. More precisely, the characteristics of the nodes (e.g., terrorists) of the network and their possible relationships (e.g., types of communication links), as well as coalitional information (e.g. level of hierarchies) independent of the network. First, for both centrality measures, we provide approximation algorithms and the corresponding R-codes. Second, as illustration, we rank the members of the Zerkani network, responsible for the attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016). Finally, we give a comparison between the rankings established by Banzhaf and Banzhaf-Owen and the rankings obtained when using the Shapley value (cf. Hamers et al., 2019) and the Owen value as centrality measures
