论文标题
保证：为受信任的执行环境介绍控制流的证明
GuaranTEE: Introducing Control-Flow Attestation for Trusted Execution Environments
论文作者
论文摘要
大多数云提供商为用户提供了部署受信任的执行环境（TEE）的可能性，以保护其数据和流程免受高特权对手的侵害。此优惠旨在解决用户将关键任务移入云时的问题。但是，TEE只允许在发布时间时证明环境的完整性。为了在运行时证明T恤的完整性，我们提供保证。担保使用控制流的证明来确保在发球区内运行的服务的完整性。通过将所有保证组件放入TEE中，我们不仅能够检测到受损的目标，而且能够保护自己免受恶意管理员的侵害。我们通过根据Microsoft Azure中的Intel SGX提供详细的性能和安全评估来显示保证的实用性。我们的评估表明，在TEE和其他验证过程之间传输信息的需求增加了高CPU负载下的大量开销。但是，我们能够通过安全地缓存收集的信息并通过执行应用程序并行执行分析来减少此开销。总而言之，我们的结果表明，保证为专注于在运行时保护其数据和流程的完整性的云用户提供了一个实用的解决方案。
The majority of cloud providers offers users the possibility to deploy Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to protect their data and processes from high privileged adversaries. This offer is intended to address concerns of users when moving critical tasks into the cloud. However, TEEs only allow to attest the integrity of the environment at launch-time. To also enable the attestation of a TEE's integrity at run-time, we present GuaranTEE. GuaranTEE uses control-flow attestation to ensure the integrity of a service running within a TEE. By additionally placing all components of GuaranTEE in TEEs, we are able to not only detect a compromised target, but are also able to protect ourselves from malicious administrators. We show the practicability of GuaranTEE by providing a detailed performance and security evaluation of our prototype based on Intel SGX in Microsoft Azure. Our evaluation shows that the need to transfer information between TEEs and the additional verification process add considerable overhead under high CPU load. Yet, we are able to reduce this overhead by securely caching collected information and by performing the analysis in parallel to executing the application. In summary, our results show that GuaranTEE provides a practical solution for cloud users focused on protecting the integrity of their data and processes at run-time.
