论文标题
减少互补性分配：两人案例
Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查了在没有附带付款的两人讨价还价问题中实施减少形式的分配概率，在这些问题上，代理商必须从有限的社会替代方案中选择一种替代方案。我们为实施性提供了必要和充分的条件。我们发现，与Border的定理相比，讨价还价中的实施性条件具有一些新功能。我们的结果在妥协问题和包装交换问题中具有应用程序，而代理易货不可分的对象和代理将对象视为补充。
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability. We find that the implementability condition in bargaining has some new feature compared to Border's theorem. Our results have applications in compromise problems and package exchange problems where the agents barter indivisible objects and the agents value the objects as complements.
