论文标题
众包评论的平行竞赛：平衡的存在和质量
Parallel Contests for Crowdsourcing Reviews: Existence and Quality of Equilibria
论文作者
论文摘要
由在区块链环境中分配国库基金的复杂性的动机，我们研究了对许多不同建议的众包评论的问题。在审查阶段，每个审阅者都可以选择为编写评论的建议以及每个评论的质量。质量水平遵循某些非常粗糙的社区准则，可以具有“优秀”或“良好”之类的价值。根据这些分数和评论的分发，每个审阅者的努力都将获得一些奖励。在本文中，我们设计了一个奖励计划，并表明它始终具有纯净的Nash Equilibria，对于任何一套建议和审阅者。此外，我们表明这些平衡可以保证两个自然指标的恒定因子近似值：与最佳结果相比，所有评论的总质量以及至少接受一份评论的建议的比例。
Motivated by the intricacies of allocating treasury funds in blockchain settings, we study the problem of crowdsourcing reviews for many different proposals, in parallel. During the reviewing phase, every reviewer can select the proposals to write reviews for, as well as the quality of each review. The quality levels follow certain very coarse community guidelines and can have values such as 'excellent' or 'good'. Based on these scores and the distribution of reviews, every reviewer will receive some reward for their efforts. In this paper, we design a reward scheme and show that it always has pure Nash equilibria, for any set of proposals and reviewers. In addition, we show that these equilibria guarantee constant factor approximations for two natural metrics: the total quality of all reviews, as well as the fraction of proposals that received at least one review, compared to the optimal outcome.
