论文标题
Absnft：基于游戏理论分析的非杀菌令牌的证券化和回购计划
ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis
论文作者
论文摘要
不可杀死的令牌（NFT）被视为区块链技术的重要应用之一。尽管NFT具有较大的市场规模和多重实际标准，但存在NFT市场现有机制的几个局限性。这项工作提出了一种新型的NFT证券化和回购计划，以克服这些局限性。我们首先提供了资产支持的证券（ABS）解决方案，以解决NFT无可接收性的局限性。我们的证券化设计旨在增强NFT的流动性，并为NFT启用Oracles和自动做市商（AMM）。然后，我们为参与者提出了一个新颖的回购协议，欠NFT的一部分以回购其他股份以获得全部所有权。由于参与者可以在收购过程中策略性地竞标，因此我们的回购过程被称为Stackelberg游戏，以探索均衡价格。我们还提供解决市场困难的解决方案，例如预算限制和懒惰的投标人。
The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is viewed as one of the important applications of blockchain technology. Although NFT has a large market scale and multiple practical standards, several limitations of the existing mechanism in NFT markets exist. This work proposes a novel securitization and repurchase scheme for NFT to overcome these limitations. We first provide an Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) solution to settle the limitations of non-fungibility of NFT. Our securitization design aims to enhance the liquidity of NFTs and enable Oracles and Automatic Market Makers (AMMs) for NFTs. Then we propose a novel repurchase protocol for a participant owing a portion of NFT to repurchase other shares to obtain the complete ownership. As participants may strategically bid during the acquisition process, our repurchase process is formulated as a Stackelberg game to explore the equilibrium prices. We also provide solutions to handle difficulties at market such as budget constraints and lazy bidders.
