论文标题
智能网格中的游戏理论能源源分配机制
Game-Theoretic Energy Source Allocation Mechanism in Smart-Grids
论文作者
论文摘要
这项工作研究了具有异质能源概况和风险态度的智能网格消费者的分散和不协调的能源选择问题：如果该能源不足以支付能源不足以满足所有此类需求，他们会争夺本地社区中有限数量的可再生能源。我们将此问题模拟为一种非合作游戏，并研究了混合策略NASH均衡（NE）的存在，当时对可再生能源的总需求超过了可用的分配策略。我们根据NE封闭形式的表达方式得出了可再生能源需求和社会成本在不同的消费者概况，能源成本和可用性下的社会成本。该分析还提供了有用的准则，可以根据消费者在某些条件下应采取的风险态度或是否应该更冒险。最后，我们从数值上研究了该分散方案的效率，而不是采用的方案标准的集中式方案。
This work studies the decentralized and uncoordinated energy source selection problem for smart-grid consumers with heterogeneous energy profiles and risk attitudes: they compete for a limited amount of renewable energy in their local community, at the risk of paying a higher cost if that energy is not enough to supply all such demand. We model this problem as a non-cooperative game and study the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (NE) under the proportional allocation policy employed when the total demand for renewable energy exceeds the available one. We derive under NE closed-form expressions for the resulting total renewable energy demand and social cost under varying consumer profiles, energy costs and availability. The analysis also provides useful guidelines as to what consumers should do (compete or not) based on their risk attitude or if they should be more risk-taking, under certain conditions. Finally, we study numerically the efficiency of this decentralized scheme compared to a centralized one via the price-of-anarchy metric.
