论文标题
福利与参与预算的代表
Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting
论文作者
论文摘要
参与预算（PB）是一个民主进程，可以根据社区成员的投票将资金分配给项目。已使用不同的规则来汇总参与者的投票。过去的研究研究了Lackner and Skowron（2020）在多赢家环境中的社会福利和公平概念（参与式预算的特殊情况）之间的权衡。但是，在更一般的PB设置中，对这种权衡几乎没有理解。本文提供了一项理论和经验研究，对几种常见规则的最坏情况保证，以更好地了解社会福利，代表性之间的权衡。我们表明，多获奖者环境中的许多保证并未概括为PB设置，并且引入成本会导致更糟的保证，从而加剧了福利代表权的权衡。我们将理论分析扩展到研究比例对投票规则的要求如何影响这一权衡。我们进一步研究比例对投票规则的要求如何影响保证对社会福利和代表性的影响。我们在实际和合成数据集上也从经验上研究了后点。我们表明，最近建议的投票规则X的变体（满足比例性）在实践中在社会福利和代表方面都做得很好。
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate participants' votes. Past research has studied the trade-off between notions of social welfare and fairness in the multi-winner setting (a special case of participatory budgeting with identical project costs) by Lackner and Skowron (2020). But there is little understanding of this trade-off in the more general PB setting. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical study of the worst-case guarantees of several common rules to better understand the trade-off between social welfare, representation. We show that many of the guarantees from the multi-winner setting do not generalize to the PB setting, and that the introduction of costs leads to substantially worse guarantees, thereby exacerbating the welfare-representation trade-off. We extend our theoretical analysis to studying how the requirement of proportionality over voting rules affects this trade-off. We further study how the requirement of proportionality over voting rules effects the guarantees on social welfare and representation. We study the latter point also empirically, both on real and synthetic datasets. We show that variants of the recently suggested voting rule Rule-X (which satisfies proportionality) do very well in practice both with respect to social welfare and representation.
