论文标题
将裁决外包给战略陪审员
Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究一个场景，其中裁决任务（例如，二进制争议的解决）将外包给被任命为陪审员的代理商。这种情况在Web3环境中尤其重要，在Web3环境中，对裁决结果不可能进行验证，并且原则上指定的代理人对最终判决无动于衷。我们考虑使用（1）多数投票来决定最终裁决的简单裁决机制，以及（2）付款职能，以奖励代理商以多数投票奖励代理商，并可能惩罚少数人。特工从战略上与这种机制进行互动：他们付出了一些努力，以了解如何正确判断争议，并施放依赖这种理解以及他们对其余投票的信息的是/否投票。最终，他们投票使他们的公用事业（即，从机制中付款减去由于努力而减去成本）。在合理的假设上，代理人的努力与她对争端的理解有关，我们表明可以使用适当的付款功能以很高的可能性来恢复正确的裁决结果。我们的发现取决于对诱发战略游戏的详细分析，并利用理论论点和仿真实验。
We study a scenario where an adjudication task (e.g., the resolution of a binary dispute) is outsourced to a set of agents who are appointed as jurors. This scenario is particularly relevant in a Web3 environment, where no verification of the adjudication outcome is possible, and the appointed agents are, in principle, indifferent to the final verdict. We consider simple adjudication mechanisms that use (1) majority voting to decide the final verdict and (2) a payment function to reward the agents with the majority vote and possibly punish the ones in the minority. Agents interact with such a mechanism strategically: they exert some effort to understand how to properly judge the dispute and cast a yes/no vote that depends on this understanding and on information they have about the rest of the votes. Eventually, they vote so that their utility (i.e., their payment from the mechanism minus the cost due to their effort) is maximized. Under reasonable assumptions about how an agent's effort is related to her understanding of the dispute, we show that appropriate payment functions can be used to recover the correct adjudication outcome with high probability. Our findings follow from a detailed analysis of the induced strategic game and make use of both theoretical arguments and simulation experiments.
