论文标题
EIP-1559的经验分析：交易费用，等待时间和共识安全
Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security
论文作者
论文摘要
交易费用机制（TFM）是区块链协议的重要组成部分。但是，仍然没有对TFM的现实影响的系统评估。使用以太坊区块链，孟买和交换的丰富数据，我们研究了EIP-1559的效果，EIP-1559是最早脱颖而出的TFM之一，它偏离了传统的首价拍卖范式。我们进行了一项严格而全面的经验研究，以检查其因果关系对区块链交易费用动态，交易等待时间和共识安全性的影响。我们的结果表明，EIP-1559通过减轻支付的气价差异并减少用户的等待时间来改善用户体验。但是，EIP-1559对汽油费水平和共识安全性的影响很小。此外，我们发现，当以太的价格更加动荡时，等待时间大大增加。我们还验证了较大的块大小会增加兄弟姐妹的存在。这些发现提出了改善TFM的新方向。
A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.
