论文标题
具有垄断社交网络的数据交易：结果主要是隐私福利损害
Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging
论文作者
论文摘要
本文认为，如果在垄断购买者的环境中进行交易，并将导致功利主义福利降低，那么在分布式的在线社交网络（例如Facebook）中具有异质隐私估值的战略个人的数据将不足。对于某些在线社区数据交易问题的家族而言，该结果与流行的信息经济学直觉形成鲜明对比，即数据市场中最终用户数据信号的数量提高了其效率。我们提出的理论为在线社交网络（OSN）的数据交易寡头市场（OSN）的未来（违反直觉）分析铺平了道路。
This paper argues that data of strategic individuals with heterogeneous privacy valuations in a distributed online social network (e.g., Facebook) will be under-priced, if traded in a monopoly buyer setting, and will lead to diminishing utilitarian welfare. This result, for a certain family of online community data trading problems, is in stark contrast to a popular information economics intuition that increased amounts of end-user data signals in a data market improves its efficiency. Our proposed theory paves the way for a future (counter-intuitive) analysis of data trading oligopoly markets for online social networks (OSNs).
