论文标题
好消息不是动机推理的足够条件
Good News Is Not a Sufficient Condition for Motivated Reasoning
论文作者
论文摘要
人们经常收到好消息，使他们对周围的世界感觉更好，或者使他们对此感到更糟的坏消息。本文研究新闻的价如何影响信念更新，缺乏功能和与自我相关的因素。使用具有超过1,500名参与者和5,600个观察结果的实验，我测试人们是否有动力的推理来过分信任好消息，而不是与价相关的问题，例如癌症存活率，其他人的幸福和婴儿死亡率。对好消息进行动机推理的估计是一个准确估计的零。可以排除在政治和绩效中积极推理的三分之一的适度效果，可以排除在外。补充调查的证据表明，大多数人期望好消息会增加幸福感，而不是系统地导致积极的推理。这些结果表明，基于信念的效用不足以使人们扭曲信念更新以偏爱这些信念。
People often receive good news that makes them feel better about the world around them, or bad news that makes them feel worse about it. This paper studies how the valence of news affects belief updating, absent functional and ego-relevant factors. Using experiments with over 1,500 participants and 5,600 observations, I test whether people engage in motivated reasoning to overly trust good news versus bad news on valence-relevant issues like cancer survival rates, others' happiness, and infant mortality. The estimate for motivated reasoning towards good news is a precisely-estimated null. Modest effects, of one-third the size of motivated reasoning in politics and performance, can be ruled out. Complementary survey evidence shows that most people expect good news to increase happiness, but to not systematically lead to motivated reasoning. These results suggest that belief-based utility is not sufficient in leading people to distort belief updating in order to favor those beliefs.
