论文标题
在移动临时网络中研究基于声誉的数据包转发的节点合作
Studying Node Cooperation in Reputation Based Packet Forwarding within Mobile Ad hoc Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
在移动临时网络(MANET)的范式中,源自其他节点的转发数据包需要节点之间的合作。但是,由于每个节点可能不想浪费能量,因此无法保证合作行为。因此,有必要实施某种机制来避免自私行为并促进合作。在本文中,我们提出了一个简单的基于Pro的信誉系统,即,如果他们不从合作用户转发数据包(基于声誉),而当他们选择不从非合作用户那里转发数据时,则会失去更高的声誉。在此框架下,我们通过研究拟议游戏的进化稳定状态来建模用户作为进化游戏的行为,并提供导致合作行为的条件。提供数值分析以研究所得的平衡,并说明与传统模型相比,所提出的模型的性能。
In the paradigm of mobile Ad hoc networks (MANET), forwarding packets originating from other nodes requires cooperation among nodes. However, as each node may not want to waste its energy, cooperative behavior can not be guaranteed. Therefore, it is necessary to implement some mechanism to avoid selfish behavior and to promote cooperation. In this paper, we propose a simple quid pro quo based reputation system, i.e., nodes that forward gain reputation, but lose more reputation if they do not forward packets from cooperative users (determined based on reputation), and lose less reputation when they chose to not forward packets from non-cooperative users. Under this framework, we model the behavior of users as an evolutionary game and provide conditions that result in cooperative behavior by studying the evolutionary stable states of the proposed game. Numerical analysis is provided to study the resulting equilibria and to illustrate how the proposed model performs compared to traditional models.