论文标题
信念错误和非拜拜斯社会学习：实验证据
Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning: Experimental Evidence
论文作者
论文摘要
本文通过实验研究个人是否持有一阶信念，即其他人应用贝叶斯规则将私人信息纳入他们的信念，这在许多贝叶斯和非贝叶斯社会学习模型中都是基本假设。我们设计了一种新颖的实验环境，其中一阶信仰假设意味着社会信息等于私人信息。我们的主要发现是，参与者报告的社会信息预订价格明显低于私人信息的保留价格，该信息提供了对一阶信仰假设的疑问的证据。我们还建立了一个新颖的信念错误模型，其中参与者用贝叶斯后信仰内核形成随机的后验信仰，以解释实验结果。该模型的结构估计表明，参与者对他人信仰错误的复杂考虑及其对错误的夸张都会导致预订价格差异。
This paper experimentally studies whether individuals hold a first-order belief that others apply Bayes' rule to incorporate private information into their beliefs, which is a fundamental assumption in many Bayesian and non-Bayesian social learning models. We design a novel experimental setting in which the first-order belief assumption implies that social information is equivalent to private information. Our main finding is that participants' reported reservation prices of social information are significantly lower than those of private information, which provides evidence that casts doubt on the first-order belief assumption. We also build a novel belief error model in which participants form a random posterior belief with a Bayesian posterior belief kernel to explain the experimental findings. A structural estimation of the model suggests that participants' sophisticated consideration of others' belief error and their exaggeration of the error both contribute to the difference in reservation prices.
