论文标题
从实践到理论：对量子密钥分配系统的“明亮照明”攻击
From Practice to Theory: The "Bright Illumination" Attack on Quantum Key Distribution Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
“明亮的照明”攻击[Lydersen等，Nat。光子。 4，686-689（2010）]是一种实际攻击，可以完全实施针对量子密钥分布系统。与量子信息处理的几乎所有发展相比（例如，Shor的分解算法，量子传送，BENNETT-BRASSARD（BB84）量子关键分布，“ Photon-M-Number Splitting”攻击以及许多其他示例），在哪些理论上已经提出了“在哪个理论”之前进行“攻击”或“攻击”的攻击者。在这里，我们解释了攻击的“反向空间”方法是如何互补的，与“量子侧渠道攻击”的概念互补（类似于“古典”中的类似术语 - 即非Quantum-计算机安全性）错过了预测“光明照明”攻击的机会。
The "Bright Illumination" attack [Lydersen et al., Nat. Photon. 4, 686-689 (2010)] is a practical attack, fully implementable against quantum key distribution systems. In contrast to almost all developments in quantum information processing (for example, Shor's factorization algorithm, quantum teleportation, Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution, the "Photon-Number Splitting" attack, and many other examples), for which theory has been proposed decades before a proper implementation, the "Bright Illumination" attack preceded any sign or hint of a theoretical prediction. Here we explain how the "Reversed-Space" methodology of attacks, complementary to the notion of "quantum side-channel attacks" (which is analogous to a similar term in "classical" - namely, non-quantum - computer security), has missed the opportunity of predicting the "Bright Illumination" attack.
