论文标题
基金管理和前瞻性绩效标准的竞争
Competition in Fund Management and Forward Relative Performance Criteria
论文作者
论文摘要
在ITO扩散市场中,两个基金经理在相对绩效方面的贸易。对于资产专业化和多元化设置,我们分析了被动和竞争性案例。我们通过前向相对绩效标准衡量管理人员策略的绩效,从而导致了远期最佳响应标准和前进纳什平衡的各个概念。制定此类标准的动机来自于放松各种至关重要但相当严格的现有假设 - 例如,市场模型和投资视野的先验选择,后者对经理的共同点以及对竞争对手的竞争对手政策的完整知识。我们专注于本地无风险的标准,并推断出随机的前方方程。我们解决了CRRA案例,从而在经典环境中扩展了相关结果。此处工作的一个重要副产品是在与完美和不完整的市场案例相关的随机赋予过程中,在ITO扩散市场的投资问题的远期绩效标准的发展。
In an Ito-diffusion market, two fund managers trade under relative performance concerns. For both the asset specialization and diversification settings, we analyze the passive and competitive cases. We measure the performance of the managers' strategies via forward relative performance criteria, leading to the respective notions of forward best-response criterion and forward Nash equilibrium. The motivation to develop such criteria comes from the need to relax various crucial, but quite stringent, existing assumptions -- such as, the a priori choices of both the market model and the investment horizon, the commonality of the latter for both managers as well as the full a priori knowledge of the competitor's policies for the best-response case. We focus on locally riskless criteria and deduce the random forward equations. We solve the CRRA cases, thus also extending the related results in the classical setting. An important by-product of the work herein is the development of forward performance criteria for investment problems in Ito-diffusion markets under the presence of correlated random endowment process for both the perfectly and the incomplete market cases.