论文标题
当“更好”比“最好”更好
When "Better" is better than "Best"
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑两个玩家普通表格游戏，每个玩家都具有相同的有限策略。 假定每个玩家的收益为I.I.D.随机变量具有连续分布。 我们表明，只要有一个，就有很高的概率，更好的响应动力学会收敛到纯Nash平衡，而最佳响应动力学在被困时就不会收敛。
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the better-response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibrium whenever there is one, whereas best-response dynamics fails to converge, as it is trapped.
