论文标题
逃税的动态模型
A dynamic model of Tax Evasion
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出了一个比例税收制度的简化模型，公民决定是缴税还是逃税。我们最初为逃避者的比例得出一个动态方程，然后呈现其临界点和平衡稳定的状态，用于混合良好的人群以及固定的审核概率。我们的理论预测通过选定的复杂网络配置考虑了不同可能的收入分布（同质和异质），时间依赖性的审计概率以及不同的社会拓扑。通过扩展的蒙特卡洛模拟，所有得出的结果均得到验证和确认。最后，提出了一些旨在减少逃税的政策影响，就税收和罚款率以及审计概率而言。
In this paper we present a simplified model of a proportional taxation system where citizens decide whether to pay taxes or evade them. We initially derive a dynamic equation for the fraction of evaders and then present both its critical points and equilibrium stable states for a well-mixed population and for a fixed audit probability. Our theoretical predictions consider different possible income distributions (homogeneous and heterogeneous), time-dependent audit probability and different possible social topologies, by means of selected complex network configurations. All derived results are validated and confirmed by extended Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, some policy implications aimed to reduce tax evasion are suggested, with regards to the tax and fine rates and the audit probability.
