论文标题

盘中电力市场的平衡价格

Equilibrium price in intraday electricity markets

论文作者

Aid, René, Cosso, Andrea, Pham, Huyên

论文摘要

我们制定了电力市场中日内交易的平衡模型。代理商在客户的消费以及盘中销售和生产以及盘中购买之间面临平衡限制。他们不断更新了对客户在成熟时消费的预测,而波动性错误降低了。预测容易出现特质噪声以及常见的噪声(天气)。代理生产能力受到独立的随机停电,每个中断都是由马尔可夫链建模的。均衡价格定义为最小化交易成本加上每个代理商不平衡成本并满足通常的市场清除条件的价格。 事实证明了平衡的存在和独特性,我们表明均衡价格和最佳交易策略是Martingales。主要的经济见解是以下内容。 (i)当一代不确定性不确定性时,这表明市场价格是每个代理商和确定性权重的预测边际成本的凸组合。 此外,均衡市场价格遵循Almgren和Chriss的模型,我们确定了基本部分以及永久市场影响。事实证明,跨代理的异质性是萨缪尔森效应的必要条件。 (ii)当存在生产不确定性时,价格波动就会随机,但是当代理人数量增加到无穷大时,案件不确定性而不会产生不确定性。此外,在两种案件中,我们表明,低边际成本生产商的潜在停电降低了她的销售额。

We formulate an equilibrium model of intraday trading in electricity markets. Agents face balancing constraints between their customers consumption plus intraday sales and their production plus intraday purchases. They have continuously updated forecast of their customers consumption at maturity with decreasing volatility error. Forecasts are prone to idiosyncratic noise as well as common noise (weather). Agents production capacities are subject to independent random outages, which are each modelled by a Markov chain. The equilibrium price is defined as the price that minimises trading cost plus imbalance cost of each agent and satisfies the usual market clearing condition. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are proved, and we show that the equilibrium price and the optimal trading strategies are martingales. The main economic insights are the following. (i) When there is no uncertainty on generation, it is shown that the market price is a convex combination of forecasted marginal cost of each agent, with deterministic weights. Furthermore, the equilibrium market price follows Almgren and Chriss's model and we identify the fundamental part as well as the permanent market impact. It turns out that heterogeneity across agents is a necessary condition for the Samuelson's effect to hold. (ii) When there is production uncertainty, the price volatility becomes stochastic but converges to the case without production uncertainty when the number of agents increases to infinity. Further, on a two-agent case, we show that the potential outages of a low marginal cost producer reduces her sales position.

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