论文标题
最小妥协的选择模型
A Model of Choice with Minimal Compromise
论文作者
论文摘要
我制定并表征以下两阶段选择行为。决策者有两个偏好。她根据第一个偏好将所有最大替代品入围。如果第一个偏好是决定性的，那么从某种意义上说，它是一个独特的选择，那么这种选择就是选择。如果将多个替代方案入围，则在第二阶段，第二个偏好在候选名单中否决其最小替代方案，而候选名单的其余成员则将选择集合。只有最终选择集可以观察到。我认为第一个偏好是弱顺序，第二个是线性顺序。因此，入围名单是完全合理化的，但其成员之一可以在第二阶段退学，从而导致有限的理性行为。鉴于潜在的二进制关系扮演的不对称角色，随之而来的行为在两个偏好之间表现出最小的妥协。据我们所知，满足Sen的$β$ Axiom的首选功能，而不是$α$。
I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the sense that it shortlists a unique alternative, then that alternative is the choice. If multiple alternatives are shortlisted, then, in a second stage, the second preference vetoes its minimal alternative in the shortlist, and the remaining members of the shortlist form the choice set. Only the final choice set is observable. I assume that the first preference is a weak order and the second is a linear order. Hence the shortlist is fully rationalizable but one of its members can drop out in the second stage, leading to bounded rational behavior. Given the asymmetric roles played by the underlying binary relations, the consequent behavior exhibits a minimal compromise between two preferences. To our knowledge it is the first Choice function that satisfies Sen's $β$ axiom of choice,but not $α$.
