论文标题
大学录取市场的大核心：理论和证据
The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究大学录取市场的稳定分配，学生可以以不同的财务方式上同一所大学。递延的接受算法确定了根据功绩分配资金的稳定分配。虽然基于绩效的稳定分配将同一学生分配到大学，但分配给大学的学生人数可能会有所不同。在大型市场中，这种可能性需要申请人对财务方面的敏感性的异质性。在存在这种异质性的匈牙利，基于非候选的稳定分配将使指定的申请人数量增加1.9％，并影响申请人的8.3％，相对于任何基于绩效的稳定分配。这些发现与匹配（没有合同）文献的发现鲜对形成鲜明对比。
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a stable allocation where funding is allocated based on merit. While merit-based stable allocations assign the same students to college, non-merit-based stable allocations may differ in the number of students assigned to college. In large markets, this possibility requires heterogeneity in applicants' sensitivity to financial terms. In Hungary, where such heterogeneity is present, a non-merit-based stable allocation would increase the number of assigned applicants by 1.9%, and affect 8.3% of the applicants relative to any merit-based stable allocation. These findings contrast sharply with findings from the matching (without contracts) literature.
