论文标题
SAFETYPIN：具有人类可持续秘密的加密备份
SafetyPin: Encrypted Backups with Human-Memorable Secrets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了Safetypin的设计和实现，Safetypin是一种用于加密移动设备备份的系统。与现有的基于云的移动背包系统（包括Apple和Google的移动装置系统）一样，Safetypin要求用户仅记住一个短的别针，并防御使用硬件安全保护措施来防止Brute-Force PIN猜测攻击。与当今的系统不同，Safetypin将对硬件安全模块（HSMS）群体的信任分开，以提供安全保证，可保证使用HSM的数量扩展。这样，Safetypin即使免受可以自适应损害该系统许多组成HSM的攻击者的支持的支持用户数据。 Safetypin提供了这种保护，而无需牺牲可伸缩性或容错性。在尊重当今HSM的资源限制的同时，分散信任需要综合系统设计原理和加密工具。我们在100个低成本HSM的群集上评估了Safetypin，并表明受保护的恢复需要1.01秒。要处理每年1B的回收，我们估计安全型部署将需要3,100个低成本HSM。
We present the design and implementation of SafetyPin, a system for encrypted mobile-device backups. Like existing cloud-based mobile-backup systems, including those of Apple and Google, SafetyPin requires users to remember only a short PIN and defends against brute-force PIN-guessing attacks using hardware security protections. Unlike today's systems, SafetyPin splits trust over a cluster of hardware security modules (HSMs) in order to provide security guarantees that scale with the number of HSMs. In this way, SafetyPin protects backed-up user data even against an attacker that can adaptively compromise many of the system's constituent HSMs. SafetyPin provides this protection without sacrificing scalability or fault tolerance. Decentralizing trust while respecting the resource limits of today's HSMs requires a synthesis of systems-design principles and cryptographic tools. We evaluate SafetyPin on a cluster of 100 low-cost HSMs and show that a SafetyPin-protected recovery takes 1.01 seconds. To process 1B recoveries a year, we estimate that a SafetyPin deployment would need 3,100 low-cost HSMs.
