论文标题
低压电力社区内资源的公平且最佳分配的新合作框架
A New Cooperative Framework for a Fair and Cost-Optimal Allocation of Resources within a Low Voltage Electricity Community
论文作者
论文摘要
本文为低压社区内的权力交换提供了一个原始的协作框架。社区试图通过每天安排其成员的资源来最大程度地降低其总成本。在这方面，利用了它们的灵活性，例如过剩的存储容量，未使用的本地发电或可转移负载。总成本不仅包括能源商品，还包括通过电力流约束的整合而与社区运营相关的网格费用。为了公平地分享社区成本，提出了两种不同的成本分配。第一个基于沙普利值采用分布密钥，而另一个则依赖于由纳什平衡定义的自然共识。结果表明，这两种协作计划都为所有个人成员提供了重要的节省。特别是，观察到基于沙普利的解决方案为动员的灵活资源提供了更大的价值，而纳什均衡奖励最终用户的潜在灵活性同意。
This paper presents an original collaborative framework for power exchanges inside a low voltage community. The community seeks to minimize its total costs by scheduling on a daily basis the resources of its members. In this respect, their flexibility such as excess storage capacity, unused local generation or shiftable load are exploited. Total costs include not only the energy commodity, but also grid fees associated to the community operation, through the integration of power flow constraints. In order to share the community costs in a fair manner, two different cost distributions are proposed. The first one adopts a distribution key based on the Shapley value, while the other relies on a natural consensus defined by a Nash equilibrium. Outcomes show that both collaboration schemes lead to important savings for all individual members. In particular, it is observed that the Shapley-based solution gives more value to mobilized flexible resources, whereas the Nash equilibrium rewards the potential flexibility consent of end-users.
