论文标题
期望，网络和约定
Expectations, Networks, and Conventions
论文作者
论文摘要
在协调游戏和投机性非处方金融市场中，解决方案取决于高阶的平均预期：代理人对交易对手的期望平均而言，他们期望对手交易对手，等等。我们对这些对象及其限制进行了统一的分析，以提供对抗时间关系的一般信息结构，先生和群体的网络。我们的关键设备是结合网络和代理信念的交互结构，我们使用Markov方法分析。该设备使我们可以在一种模型中嵌套古典的选美比赛和网络游戏，并统一其结果。两种应用说明了这些技术：首先，当对交易对手的平均期望的轻微乐观态度导致乐观和极端资产价格的传染时，首先是特征。第二个描述了最低信息的暴政：代理人根据私人信息最糟糕的私人信息的先前期望进行协调，尽管所有人都基于精确的私人信号，但对事后最佳行动具有几乎共同的确定性。
In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on average, expect their counterparties to think, etc. We offer a unified analysis of these objects and their limits, for general information structures, priors, and networks of counterparty relationships. Our key device is an interaction structure combining the network and agents' beliefs, which we analyze using Markov methods. This device allows us to nest classical beauty contests and network games within one model and unify their results. Two applications illustrate the techniques: The first characterizes when slight optimism about counterparties' average expectations leads to contagion of optimism and extreme asset prices. The second describes the tyranny of the least-informed: agents coordinating on the prior expectations of the one with the worst private information, despite all having nearly common certainty, based on precise private signals, of the ex post optimal action.
