论文标题
偏见的RSA私钥：GCD键键的起源归因
Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys
论文作者
论文摘要
2016年，Svenda等。 （USENIX 2016，百万键问题）报告说，加密图书馆中的实施选择允许对公共RSA键的起源进行合格的猜测。我们将技术扩展到两个新方案时，不仅公开，而且可以用于原点归因 - 分析IPv4范围内TLS扫描中的GCD键键以及对未知来源的法医研究的分析。我们从私钥中学习了几位偏见的代表，以培训从70个加密库，硬件安全模块和加密智能卡中收集的超过1.5亿键的模型。我们的模型不仅增加了可区分的库组数量（与Svenda等人的公共钥匙相比），而且精确度W.R.T.的两倍以上也可以提高两倍以上。随机猜测何时将单键分类。对于从同一来源至少10个键的法医场景，正确识别正确的原点库的平均精度为89％，而随机猜测的精度为4％。该技术还用于识别产生GCD效应TLS键的库，表明只有三组是可能的嫌疑犯。
In 2016, Svenda et al. (USENIX 2016, The Million-key Question) reported that the implementation choices in cryptographic libraries allow for qualified guessing about the origin of public RSA keys. We extend the technique to two new scenarios when not only public but also private keys are available for the origin attribution - analysis of a source of GCD-factorable keys in IPv4-wide TLS scans and forensic investigation of an unknown source. We learn several representatives of the bias from the private keys to train a model on more than 150 million keys collected from 70 cryptographic libraries, hardware security modules and cryptographic smartcards. Our model not only doubles the number of distinguishable groups of libraries (compared to public keys from Svenda et al.) but also improves more than twice in accuracy w.r.t. random guessing when a single key is classified. For a forensic scenario where at least 10 keys from the same source are available, the correct origin library is correctly identified with average accuracy of 89% compared to 4% accuracy of a random guess. The technique was also used to identify libraries producing GCD-factorable TLS keys, showing that only three groups are the probable suspects.
