论文标题
量子密钥分布的安全分析，其块长度很小，并且应用于量子空间通信
Security analysis of quantum key distribution with small block length and its application to quantum space communications
论文作者
论文摘要
现实世界中量子密钥分布（QKD）的安全性在很大程度上取决于系统可以在固定时间间隔内收集的数据点数。迄今为止，最先进的有限键安全分析需要按1E4位的顺序进行块长度，才能获得积极的秘密键。但是，在实践中，这一要求可能很难实现，尤其是在基于纠缠的卫星QKD系统的情况下，总体渠道损失可以达到70 dB或更多。在这里，我们提供了改进的有限键安全分析，可以将标准渠道和协议设置的块长度要求减少14％至17％。实际上，这种减少可以节省基于纠缠的卫星QKD数周的测量时间和资源，从而使基于空间的QKD技术更接近现实。作为一个应用程序，我们使用改进的分析表明，最近报道的Micius QKD卫星能够以$ 1E-5 $的安全级别生成积极的秘密密钥。
The security of real-world quantum key distribution (QKD) critically depends on the number of data points the system can collect in a fixed time interval. To date, state-of-the-art finite-key security analyses require block lengths in the order of 1E4 bits to obtain positive secret keys. This requirement, however, can be very difficult to achieve in practice, especially in the case of entanglement-based satellite QKD systems, where the overall channel loss can go up to 70 dB or more. Here, we provide an improved finite-key security analysis which can reduce the block length requirement by 14% to 17% for standard channel and protocol settings. In practical terms, this reduction could save entanglement-based satellite QKD weeks of measurement time and resources, thereby bringing space-based QKD technology closer to reality. As an application, we use the improved analysis to show that the recently reported Micius QKD satellite is capable of generating positive secret keys with a $1E-5$ security level.
