论文标题
在现代硬件上安全的内存管理
Secure Memory Management on Modern Hardware
论文作者
论文摘要
从手机SOC到带有加速器的高端服务器，几乎所有现代硬件都包含内存翻译和保护硬件，例如Iommus，防火墙和查找表，使得无法推理，并仅基于处理器的MMU进行保护和隔离。这导致了当今系统软件中的许多错误和安全漏洞。 在本文中，我们使用参考监视器中介对内存资源的访问的验证概念来重新获得有关访问控制和强制访问控制的能力。我们提出了一种细粒度，现实的记忆保护模型，该模型使该传统概念今天适用，并将系统软件符合现代，异构硬件的复杂性。 无论建筑如何，我们的设计都适用于任何操作系统。我们表明，它不仅可以执行系统的完整性属性，而且在没有固有的性能开销的情况下执行此操作，甚至可以通过可信赖的硬件规格来通过代码生成自动化。
Almost all modern hardware, from phone SoCs to high-end servers with accelerators, contain memory translation and protection hardware like IOMMUs, firewalls, and lookup tables which make it impossible to reason about, and enforce protection and isolation based solely on the processor's MMUs. This has led to numerous bugs and security vulnerabilities in today's system software. In this paper we regain the ability to reason about and enforce access control using the proven concept of a reference monitor mediating accesses to memory resources. We present a fine-grained, realistic memory protection model that makes this traditional concept applicable today, and bring system software in line with the complexity of modern, heterogeneous hardware. Our design is applicable to any operating system, regardless of architecture. We show that it not only enforces the integrity properties of a system, but does so with no inherent performance overhead and it is even amenable to automation through code generation from trusted hardware specifications.
