论文标题
贝叶斯的模拟论点方法
A Bayesian Approach to the Simulation Argument
论文作者
论文摘要
Bostrom（2003）提出的模拟参数表明，我们可能生活在复杂的计算机模拟中。如果后人类文明最终既具有产生类似Bostrom的模拟的能力和愿望，那么模拟现实的数量将大大超过一个基本现实，表面上表明我们不生活在所述基本现实中。在这项工作中，有人认为，由于从技术上讲这种模拟的假设仍然未经证实，因此统计计算不仅需要考虑状态空间的数量，还需要考虑固有的模型不确定性。通过贝叶斯对该问题的处理可以实现，这是在此提出的。使用贝叶斯模型平均，这表明我们是SIMS的概率实际上少于50％，在无限数量的模拟限制下趋向于该值。关于人类尚未孕育此类模拟或忽略它的事实，这一结果是漠不关心的。正如其他地方所说的那样，发现人类确实开始产生这种模拟，那么这将从根本上改变赔率，并使我们实际上很可能是Sims。
The Simulation Argument posed by Bostrom (2003) suggests that we may be living inside a sophisticated computer simulation. If post-human civilizations eventually have both the capability and desire to generate such Bostrom-like simulations, then the number of simulated realities would greatly exceed the one base reality, ostensibly indicating a high probability that we do not live in said base reality. In this work, it is argued that since the hypothesis that such simulations are technically possible remains unproven, then statistical calculations need to consider not just the number of state spaces, but the intrinsic model uncertainty. This is achievable through a Bayesian treatment of the problem, which is presented here. Using Bayesian model averaging, it is shown that the probability that we are sims is in fact less than 50%, tending towards that value in the limit of an infinite number of simulations. This result is broadly indifferent as to whether one conditions upon the fact that humanity has not yet birthed such simulations, or ignore it. As argued elsewhere, it is found that if humanity does start producing such simulations, then this would radically shift the odds and make it very probable that we are in fact sims.
