论文标题
网络感知的需求侧管理框架和社区储能系统正在考虑电压约束
Network-Aware Demand-side Management Framework with A Community Energy Storage System Considering Voltage Constraints
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了将社区储能（CES）系统与屋顶光伏（PV）发电的可行性，用于对社区的需求侧管理，同时将分配网络电压保持在允许的限制内。为此，我们在CES提供商和具有屋顶PV系统的用户之间开发了一个分散的能源交易系统。通过利用线性化的分支流模型的径向分配网络，开发了电压受限的领导者stackelberg游戏，其中CES提供商可以最大程度地利用收入，并且用户通过将能源与CES系统和电网交易来最大程度地减少其个人能源成本。 Stackelberg游戏具有独特的平衡，在该均衡中，CES提供商最大化收入，用户以独特的NASH均衡将能源成本最小化。具有现实的PV发电和需求数据的案例研究证实，能源交易系统可以减少峰值能源需求并防止网络电压偏移，同时为用户和CES提供商带来财务收益。此外，模拟强调，与集中式系统相比，分散的能源交易系统为能源储能减少的用户提供了更大的经济利益。
This paper studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) system with rooftop photovoltaic (PV) power generation for demand-side management of a neighbourhood while maintaining the distribution network voltages within allowed limits. To this end, we develop a decentralized energy trading system between a CES provider and users with rooftop PV systems. By leveraging a linearized branch flow model for radial distribution networks, a voltage-constrained leader-follower Stackelberg game is developed wherein the CES provider maximizes revenue and the users minimize their personal energy costs by trading energy with the CES system and the grid. The Stackelberg game has a unique equilibrium at which the CES provider maximizes revenue and the users minimize energy costs at a unique Nash equilibrium. A case study, with realistic PV power generation and demand data, confirms that the energy trading system can reduce peak energy demand and prevent network voltage excursions, while delivering financial benefits to the users and the CES provider. Further, simulations highlight that, in comparison with a centralized system, the decentralized energy trading system provides greater economic benefits to the users with less energy storage capacity.
