论文标题
与激励兼容的智能合同，用于分散商业
An Incentive-Compatible Smart Contract for Decentralized Commerce
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一份智能合约，允许两个相互不信任的政党通过在区块链上部署智能合同来作为托管，从而交易任何非数字商品或服务。合同通过让各方押注他们可以说服仲裁员是诚实的政党来解决争议。我们将合同分析为一种广泛的游戏，并证明诚实的策略在强大的游戏理论意义上是安全的，并且只有当仲裁者偏向诚实的政党时。通过放松安全概念，我们可以通过随机的硬币折腾代替仲裁者。最后，我们以摊销交易费用的方式展示了如何将合同推广到多方交易。
We propose a smart contract that allows two mutually distrusting parties to transact any non-digital good or service by deploying a smart contract on a blockchain to act as escrow. The contract settles disputes by letting parties wager that they can convince an arbiter that they were the honest party. We analyse the contract as an extensive-form game and prove that the honest strategy is secure in a strong game-theoretic sense if and only if the arbiter is biased in favor of honest parties. By relaxing the security notion, we can replace the arbiter by a random coin toss. Finally, we show how to generalize the contract to multiparty transactions in a way that amortizes the transaction fees.
