论文标题
内部和外部社会状况之间的折衷在小组选择中的含义
Implications of the Tradeoff between Inside and Outside Social Status in Group Choice
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查了追求社会地位的代理人的群体选择问题。我们假设异质的代理商希望向他人发出私人信息（能力，收入，耐心，利他主义等）的信号，面临“外部状态”之间的权衡（渴望从外部观察者那里被享有声望的群体中被认为是内部的地位）和“内部地位”（渴望从他们小组内的同伴感知才华横溢）。为了分析权衡，我们开发了两个阶段信号模型，每个代理商首先选择她的小组，其次选择她在选择的小组中的行动。他们在小组和行动选择中都面临二元选择问题。使用截止策略，我们构建了一个部分分离的平衡，因此有四个人群：（i）在组中以强大的动力选择高群体，（ii）高群体具有较弱的动力，（iii）低群体具有强大的动力，（iv）低群体的低群体。根据比较静态的结果，我们发现了某个组到另一组的溢出效应，这些溢出效应在每个组中采取策略时如何改变四个人群。这些结果对诸如学校，公司或住宅偏好之类的小组选择问题具有丰富的影响。
We investigate a group choice problem of agents pursuing social status. We assume heterogeneous agents want to signal their private information (ability, income, patience, altruism, etc.) to others, facing tradeoff between "outside status" (desire to be perceived in prestigious group from outside observers) and "inside status" (desire to be perceived talented from peers inside their group). To analyze the tradeoff, we develop two stage signaling model in which each agent firstly chooses her group and secondly chooses her action in the group she chose. They face binary choice problems both in group and action choices. Using cutoff strategy, we construct an partially separating equilibrium such that there are four populations: (i) choosing high group with strong incentive for action in the group, (ii) high group with weak incentive, (iii) low group with strong incentive, and (iv) low group with weak incentive. By comparative statics results, we find some spillover effects from a certain group to another, on how four populations change, when a policy is taken in each group. These results have rich implications for group choice problems like school, firm or residential preference.
