论文标题
狂热和影响选民模型中的最大化：何时针对狂热者？
Zealotry and Influence Maximization in the Voter Model: When to Target Zealots?
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们研究了在复杂网络上存在有偏见的选民（或狂热者）的情况下，选民模型中的最大化。在什么条件下，有限预算的外部控制器应旨在最大化其对系统的影响目标狂热者？我们的分析基于分析结果和数值结果，显示了对狂热者分配的偏好和程度依赖性的丰富图表，而正常药物的偏好和程度依赖性随预算而变化。我们发现，当我们的预算较大或狂热的水平较低时，最佳策略应为狂热者提供更大的分配，并且分配与节点程度正相关。相比之下，对于低预算或高偏见的狂热者，最佳策略对正常药物的分配具有更高的分配，对狂热者的一些残留分配，并且对两种类型的药物的分配随节点程度降低。我们的结果强调，代理特性的异质性强烈影响影响异质网络最大化的策略。
In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (or zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target zealots? Our analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to zealots and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should give larger allocations to zealots and allocations are positively correlated with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots, optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some residual allocations to zealots, and allocations to both types of agents decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks.
