论文标题
lindahl均衡作为集体选择规则
Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule
论文作者
论文摘要
一个集体选择问题是一套有限的社会选择和一套有限的具有VNM公用事业功能的经济代理商。我们将公共物品经济与每个集体选择问题联系起来，并确定（同等收入）Lindahl均衡分配的存在和效率。我们将集体选择问题解释为合作讨价还价问题，并定义了设定的解决方案概念{\ IT公平解决方案}（ES）。我们提供表征ES并表明ES包含NASH谈判解决方案的公理。我们的主要结果表明，ES收益集与Lindahl均衡收益相同。我们考虑两种应用：在第一个应用中，我们表明，在不转移的大量匹配问题中，Lindahl平衡收益集与（同等收入）Walrasian均衡收益相同。在我们的第二个应用程序中，我们表明，在任何离散的交换经济中，每一个沃尔拉斯均衡收益都是相应的集体选择市场的Lindahl均衡收益。此外，对于任何合作讨价还价问题，都可以定义一组商品，以便由此产生的经济实用性可能性是讨价还价问题{\ it and}，由此产生的经济经济的一组沃尔拉斯均衡收益与相应的集体选择市场相同。
A collective choice problem is a finite set of social alternatives and a finite set of economic agents with vNM utility functions. We associate a public goods economy with each collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of (equal income) Lindahl equilibrium allocations. We interpret collective choice problems as cooperative bargaining problems and define a set-valued solution concept, {\it the equitable solution} (ES). We provide axioms that characterize ES and show that ES contains the Nash bargaining solution. Our main result shows that the set of ES payoffs is the same a the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs. We consider two applications: in the first, we show that in a large class of matching problems without transfers the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of (equal income) Walrasian equilibrium payoffs. In our second application, we show that in any discrete exchange economy without transfers every Walrasian equilibrium payoff is a Lindahl equilibrium payoff of the corresponding collective choice market. Moreover, for any cooperative bargaining problem, it is possible to define a set of commodities so that the resulting economy's utility possibility set is that bargaining problem {\it and} the resulting economy's set of Walrasian equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs of the corresponding collective choice market.
