论文标题
法师：一组没有信任的第三方的飞地的相互证明
MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties
论文作者
论文摘要
英特尔软件守卫扩展（SGX）本地和远程证明机制使飞地能够证明其身份（即，飞地测量值，这是其初始代码和数据的加密哈希夫）到飞地。为了验证证明身份的信任，一个飞地通常包括对IT信托信任的飞地的测量，因为如果运行时没有可信赖的第三方可用来提供此信息，则预先将其信任到其初始数据中。但是，当需要这两个飞地之间的相互信任时，由于初始数据的任何更改都会改变其测量结果，因此同时将其同时包含在自己的初始数据中是不可行的，从而使先前随附的测量结果无效。在本文中，我们提出了法师，这是一个框架，使一组飞地在没有信任的第三方的情况下相互证明。特别是，我们引入了一种技术来仪器这些飞地，以便它们每个人都可以使用自己的初始数据来得出其他人的测量结果。我们还提供了基于Intel SGX SDK的原型实现，以促进飞地开发人员采用此技术。
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic hash of its initial code and data) to an enclave. To verify that the attested identity is trusted, one enclave usually includes the measurement of the enclave it trusts into its initial data in advance assuming no trusted third parties are available during runtime to provide this piece of information. However, when mutual trust between these two enclaves is required, it is infeasible to simultaneously include into their own initial data the other's measurements respectively as any change to the initial data will change their measurements, making the previously included measurements invalid. In this paper, we propose MAGE, a framework enabling a group of enclaves to mutually attest each other without trusted third parties. Particularly, we introduce a technique to instrument these enclaves so that each of them could derive the others' measurements using information solely from its own initial data. We also provide a prototype implementation based on Intel SGX SDK, to facilitate enclave developers to adopt this technique.
