论文标题
SOK：为什么约翰尼无法修复PGP标准化
SoK: Why Johnny Can't Fix PGP Standardization
论文作者
论文摘要
长期以来，相当好的隐私（PGP）一直是加密电子邮件的主要IETF标准，但遭受了广泛的可用性和安全问题的影响，这些问题限制了其采用。随着时间的流逝，底层加密协议已经过时了，因为PGP是根据每条消息的未经身份验证并在加密之前压缩的。 PGP生态系统使用的越来越过时的原语和复杂的客户越来越多的攻击越来越多。但是，除了添加现代加密原始图外，IETF的尝试更新OpenPGP标准的尝试已失败。在官方标准化之外，AutoCrypt是一种“自下而上”的社区尝试修复PGP，但仍然是对涉及身份验证的PGP攻击的受害者。无法“修复” PGP的核心原因是缺乏简单的AEAD界面，这反过来又需要一个分散的公共密钥基础架构才能与电子邮件一起使用。然而，即使像MLS这样的标准取代了PGP，分散的PKI的部署仍然是一个空旷的问题。
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) has long been the primary IETF standard for encrypting email, but suffers from widespread usability and security problems that have limited its adoption. As time has marched on, the underlying cryptographic protocol has fallen out of date insofar as PGP is unauthenticated on a per message basis and compresses before encryption. There have been an increasing number of attacks on the increasingly outdated primitives and complex clients used by the PGP eco-system. However, attempts to update the OpenPGP standard have failed at the IETF except for adding modern cryptographic primitives. Outside of official standardization, Autocrypt is a "bottom-up" community attempt to fix PGP, but still falls victim to attacks on PGP involving authentication. The core reason for the inability to "fix" PGP is the lack of a simple AEAD interface which in turn requires a decentralized public key infrastructure to work with email. Yet even if standards like MLS replace PGP, the deployment of a decentralized PKI remains an open issue.
