论文标题
稳定的社区结构和社会排斥
Stable Community Structures and Social Exclusion
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们使用游戏理论方法研究了社会（信息）网络中的社会排斥，并研究某种纳什均衡的阶级社区结构的稳定性。我们的分析的主要结果表明，该类的所有稳定社区结构（NASH Equilibria）都是社区结构，某些代理在社会上被排斥，并且不属于任何社区。这个结果非常引人注目，因为它表明社会排斥可能是社交网络中的“规范”（预期的结果），而不是异常。
In this paper we study social exclusion in social (information) networks using a game-theoretic approach, and study the stability of a certain class community structures that are a Nash equilibrium. The main result of our analysis shows that all stable community structures (Nash equilibria) in this class are community structures under which some agents are socially excluded, and do not belong to any of the communities. This result is quite striking as it suggests that social exclusion might be the "norm" (an expected outcome) in social networks, rather than an anomaly.
